CRONE, Judge.
John M. Abbott, LLC ("Abbott LLC"), acting as class representative, filed a class action against Lake City Bank ("the Bank"), maintaining that the Bank breached the terms of its promissory note ("the Note") executed in conjunction with certain commercial real estate loans. The dispute concerned the Bank's use of a 365/360 interest calculation method and its alleged impact on the interest owed. The Bank filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Abbott LLC now appeals, asserting that genuine issues of material fact exist that render summary judgment improper. Finding no genuine issue of material fact, we affirm the trial court's summary judgment order.
In 2006, John Abbott sought to purchase a retail hardware business in Rochester. He formed Abbott LLC (of which he is sole owner) to purchase and obtain financing for the business. Abbott LLC sought a $150,000 commercial loan from the Bank. At closing, John Abbott signed the Note on behalf of Abbott LLC. The Note contains a provision stating that the borrower
With respect to payment and interest rate, the Note states in pertinent part,
Appellant's App. at 114 (emphasis added).
In June 2009, the Bank filed a commercial foreclosure action against certain borrowers. As part of that action, the borrowers filed a counterclaim seeking certification as a class and claiming that the Bank breached the terms of the Note pertaining to the interest rate. In January 2012, the trial court conditionally certified and stayed the class. In September 2012, counsel for Abbott LLC (and for the class) filed a motion to substitute Abbott LLC as class representative. The trial court granted the motion.
In its class action, Abbott LLC claimed that the Bank exceeded the agreed-upon interest rate by applying the 365/360 ratio. The Bank filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted following a hearing. Abbott LLC now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
Abbott LLC contends that the trial court erred in granting the Bank's motion for summary judgment. We review the trial court's decision to grant or deny summary
Interpretation and construction of contract provisions are questions of law. Fischer v. Heymann, 943 N.E.2d 896, 900 (Ind.Ct.App.2011), trans. denied. As such, cases involving contract interpretation are particularly appropriate for summary judgment. Westfield Cos. v. Knapp, 804 N.E.2d 1270, 1274 (Ind.Ct. App.2004), trans. denied. We review the contract as a whole, attempting to ascertain the parties' intent and making every attempt to construe the contract's language "so as not to render any words, phrases, or terms ineffective or meaningless." Fischer, 943 N.E.2d at 900 (citation omitted). We examine the parties' intent at the time the contract was made. Dave's Excavating, Inc. v. City of New Castle, 959 N.E.2d 369, 376-77 (Ind.Ct.App.2012), trans. denied.
Where terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, we will apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms and enforce the contract according to its terms. Claire's Boutiques, Inc. v. Brownsburg Station Partners LLC, 997 N.E.2d 1093, 1098 (Ind.Ct.App.2013). If necessary, the text of a disputed provision may be understood by referring to other provisions within the four corners of the document. Id. The four corners rule states that where the language of a contract is unambiguous, the parties' intent is to be determined by reviewing the language contained within the "four corners" of the contract, and "parol or extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to expand, vary, or explain the instrument unless there has been a showing of fraud, mistake, ambiguity, illegality, duress or undue influence." Adams v. Reinaker, 808 N.E.2d 192, 196 (Ind.Ct.App.2004). Extrinsic evidence cannot be used to create an ambiguity.
Here, Abbott LLC claims that the Bank's Note is intrinsically ambiguous, citing the following sentence in the "PAYMENT" paragraph of the Note: "The annual interest rate for this Note is computed on a 365/360 basis; that is, by applying the ratio of the annual interest rate over a year of 360 days, multiplied by the outstanding principal balance, multiplied by the actual number of days the principal balance is outstanding." Appellant's App. at 114 (emphasis added). Abbott specifically challenges the use of the term "annual interest rate" instead of "annual interest payments" or "annual interest amount" immediately preceding the statement concerning use of the 365/360 method. In granting the Bank's motion for summary judgment, the trial court found the highlighted clause unambiguous as a matter of law and found that the "PAYMENT" and "VARIABLE INTEREST RATE" paragraphs could be harmonized. Abbott LLC characterizes this as the trial court improperly rewriting the contract. See Claire's Boutiques, 997 N.E.2d at 1098 ("Nor may a court write a new contract for the parties or supply missing terms under the guise of construing a contract.").
We disagree and find persuasive the Ohio Supreme Court's recent decision in KeyBank, another putative class action in which the disputed terms were nearly identical to the ones here. In reinstating the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the bank, the KeyBank court explained,
981 N.E.2d at 806.
Likewise, here, we find that the explanatory phrase that immediately follows the disputed clause negates any confusion that otherwise might have been caused by the inclusion of the term "annual interest rate" instead of "annual interest amount" when specifying the method of calculating payments. As in KeyBank, the Note makes it clear that the term being defined (the 365/360 method) is the method of computing regular interest payments, not the annual interest rate. As for the interest rate, the "VARIABLE INTEREST RATE" paragraph clearly states that the interest rate will be tied to the "Five Year Treasury Bill" index. Id. at 114.
Under Indiana law, a party to a contract "is presumed to understand and assent to the terms of the contracts he or she signs." Sanford v. Castleton Health Care Ctr., LLC, 813 N.E.2d 411, 418 (Ind. Ct.App.2004), trans. dismissed (2006). Additionally, here, the Note specifies that each borrower acknowledges reading and understanding the Note's terms before signing. In other words, the timeframe for a borrower to seek clarification concerning the terms is before signing. In the case of Abbott LLC, there is no designated evidence to indicate that John Abbott ever sought clarification before signing. Instead, Abbott LLC's designated extrinsic evidence comprises evaluations and opinions offered years after the date of execution of the Note. Even if an ambiguity were present, this evidence would shed no light on the parties' intent as of the time of contract formation.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude as a matter of law that the Note is not ambiguous. As such, we affirm the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the Bank.
Affirmed.
BAKER, J., and BARNES, J., concur.